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Big 5 Corp. dba Big 5 Sporting Goods ("Big 5"), a defendant and appellee in the 
above-captioned case, submits this brief pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
L STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
IL STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
AND CORRESPONDING STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee, Big 5, disputes Appellants' Statement of Issues numbered I, II, and III 
and asserts the issues are more correctly stated as follows: 
Issue No, 1: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to Big 5 finding that the 
complaint was not timely filed? 
"When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, this court gives no deference to 
the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews the issues presented under a correctness 
standard." Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, f 8, 
167 P.3d 1080 (quoting DairylandIns. Co. v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 
1143, 1144 (Utah 1994)). 
Issue No. 2: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to Big 5 finding that the 
statute of limitations was not tolled pursuant to a statutory prohibition under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-112 for the period of time when Big 5 forfeited its corporate charter for 
v 
failure to appoint a registered agent in Delaware? 
Both the application of a statute of limitations and the interpretation of statutory 
provisions present questions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Russell Packard 
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 118, 108 P.3d 741 (quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 
24,f32,44P.3d742). 
Issue No. 3: 
Did the trial court err in determining that the tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-104, was inapplicable where Big 5 continued to exist as a corporation in the state 
of Utah and was amenable to service of process within the state during the entire 
limitations period? 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Id. 
Issue No. 4: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment without holding a hearing? 
"The question of whether the court erred in granting summary judgment without a 
hearing is governed by Rule [7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] and is therefore a 
matter of statutory construction which is reviewed for correctness." Price v. Armour, 949 
P.2d 1251,1254 (Utah 1997). 
in. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The issues presented on appeal are governed by the following statutes and rules. 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307 provides: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received: 
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(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; 
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; or 
(c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
(2) for a claim, for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, 
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to 
one year, under Section 25-6-10: 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); and 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
II. Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-112 provides: 
The duration of an injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an action 
may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations. 
m . § 78B-2-104 provides: 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state, the action 
may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. 
If after a cause of action accrues the person departs from the state, the time of his absence 
is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
IV. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 136(c) provides: 
(c) After the resignation of the registered agent shall have become effective as 
provided in this section and if no new registered agent shall have been obtained and 
designated in the time and manner aforesaid, service of legal process against the 
corporation for which the resigned registered agent had been acting shall thereafter 
be upon the Secretary of State in accordance with § 321 of this title. 
V. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 312 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) As used in this section, the term "certificate of incorporation" includes the 
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charter of a corporation organized under any special act or any law of this State. 
(b) Any corporation may, at any time before the expiration of the time limited for 
its existence and any corporation whose certificate of incorporation has become 
forfeited or void pursuant to this title and any corporation whose certificate of 
incorporation has expired by reason of failure to renew it or whose certificate of 
incorporation has been renewed, but, through failure to comply strictly with the 
provisions of this chapter, the validity of whose renewal has been brought into 
question, may at any time procure an extension, restoration, renewal or revival of 
its certificate of incorporation, together with all the rights, franchises, privileges and 
immunities and subject to all of its duties, debts and liabilities which had been 
secured or imposed by its original certificate of incorporation and all amendments 
thereto. 
* * * 
(e) Upon the filing of the certificate in accordance with §103 of this title the 
corporation shall be renewed and revived with the same force and effect as if its 
certificate of incorporation had not been forfeited or void pursuant to this title, or 
had not expired by limitation. Such reinstatement shall validate all contracts, acts, 
matters and things made, done and performed within the scope of its certificate of 
incorporation by the corporation, its officers and agents during the time when its 
certificate of incorporation was forfeited or void pursuant to this title, or after its 
expiration by limitation, with the same force and effect and to all intents and 
purposes as if the certificate of incorporation had at all times remained in full force 
and effect. All real and personal property, rights and credits, which belonged to the 
corporation at the time its certificate of incorporation became forfeited or void 
pursuant to this title, or expired by limitation and which were not disposed of prior 
to the time of its revival or renewal shall be vested in the corporation, after its 
revival and renewal, as fully and amply as they were held by the corporation at and 
before the time its certificate of incorporation became forfeited or void pursuant to 
this title, or expired by limitation, and the corporation after its renewal and revival 
shall be as exclusively liable for all contracts, acts, matters and things made, done or 
performed in its name and on its behalf by its officers and agents prior to its 
reinstatement, as if its certificate of incorporation had at all times remained in full 
force and effect. 
VI. Rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a 
hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A 
request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption of the document 
containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under 
Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action 
viii 
unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue 
has been authoritatively decided. 
ix 
IV, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
On December 1, 2001, Plaintiff/Appellant Mark Greer ("Greer") claims that he 
was injured at a Big 5 Sporting Goods store in Salt Lake City, Utah when a snowboard 
fell from a disptey and struck him on the head. Greer subsequently filed a negligence 
action against Big 5 and served Big 5 with a copy of the summons and complaint on 
April 4,2006. The copy of the complaint that was served on Big 5 bears a Third District 
date stamp dated November 28, 2005. The Third District, however, has no record of ever 
having received the complaint bearing a date stamp of November 28,2005. Instead, the 
Third District's docket - as well as court's file - only shows that a complaint was filed on 
December 2, 2005. Pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-307, Greer was required to bring his negligence action within four years or on or 
before December 1,2005. Greer failed to do so. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment in favor of Big 5 dismissing Greer's claims. 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition of Case in the Trial Court 
1. The docket and file of the Third District reflect that Greer filed this 
action on December 2, 2005. (R. 1-8.) 
2. On April 4, 2006, Big 5 was served with a summons and a copy of a 
complaint bearing a date stamp of November 28,2005. (R. 59-62.) 
3. On January 7, 2008, Big 5 moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that Greer's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (R. 74-80.) 
x 
4. Pursuant to the ruling dated March 28,2008, the trial court entered 
an Order granting Big 5's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Greer's 
claims against Big 5 with prejudice. (R. 125-128.) 
5. On April 7,2008, Greer filed a motion to alter or set aside the 
judgment. (R. 129-133.) 
6. Greer filed a Notice of Appeal on April 24,2008. (R. 139.) 
7. By minute entry dated May 8,2008, the trial court denied Greer's 
motion to alter or set aside the judgment. (R. 150-151.) 
C. Statement of Facts1 Relevant to Issues Presented on Appeal. 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment as to Greer's claims, Big 5 
submitted the following statement of undisputed material facts, with citations to the 
record, as required by Rules 7(c) and 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. Greer claims he was injured at a Big 5 store on December 1,2001. (R. 2.) 
2. Greer served Big 5 with a copy of the summons and complaint in this case 
on April 4,2006. (R. 59-62.) 
3. The copy of the complaint that was served on Big 5 bears a Third District 
date stamp dated November 28, 2005. (R. 60.) 
4. However, a certified copy of the Complaint obtained from the Third 
District bears a date stamp of December 2, 2005. (R. 64-66.) 
1
 Greer's statement of facts is defective because it improperly contains numerous factual 
assertions without any record citation. In addition, these factual assertions were not 
properly presented to the trial court in response to Big 5's summary judgment motion 
and, therefore, not properly argued on appeal. 
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5. The complaint served on Big 5 bearing a date stamp of November 28, 2005 
is not in the Court's file and the Court has no record of ever having received it. (R. 110-
111.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted Big 5's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing Greer's claims against Big 5. On appeal, Greer asks this Court to find that his 
claims are not time barred by holding that the trial court erred in not finding that Greer 
filed his complaint on November 28, 2005 by placing it in the after hours box. Greer, 
however, presented no evidence at the trial court in support of this assertion and he 
cannot do so now on appeal. In addition, Greer made no effort whatsoever to explain 
why a second non-amended complaint bearing a date stamp of December 2,2005 is the 
only complaint on file with the Third District. Furthermore, Greer offered no explanation 
as to why the signatures and handwritten dates on the two complaints are clearly 
different. Thus, the trial court's finding that the complaint was not filed until December 
2, 2005 is supported by sufficient evidence. 
Greer's efforts to avoid summary judgment were factually and legally insufficient. 
Greer argued that if the trial court found that the complaint was not filed until December 
2,2005, the statute of limitations was tolled due to (1) a statutory prohibition against 
bringing suit against a corporation in forfeiture for failure to appoint a registered agent, 
and (2) Big 5 was "absent" from the state of Utah during the period of forfeiture and not 
amenable to suit. The trial court correctly determined, however, that the statute of 
limitations was not tolled pursuant to either Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-2-104 or 78B-2-112. 
xii 
Rather, Big 5's certificate of incorporation was restored and revived effective on June 11, 
2003 as if the forfeiture had never occurred. Moreover, Greer was not statutorily 
prohibited from bringing his claims against Big 5 during the period of forfeiture. Big 5 
also continued to exist as a corporation even while in forfeiture and was amenable to 
service of process in both Delaware and Utah during the limitations period. 
Finally, the trial court did not err in denying Greer's request for a hearing on Big 
5's motion. The substantive issues have been authoritatively decided under well 
established Delaware and Utah law. Greer's motion in opposition was frivolous in that 
his legal arguments and factual assertions were insufficient. Finally, Greer failed to show 
that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his request for a hearing. For these 
reasons, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
xiii 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT GREER'S 
CLAIMS AGAINST BIG 5 ARE TIME BARRED. 
Under section 78B-2-307 of the Utah Code, Greer's negligence action against Big 
5 must have been brought within four years of the accident. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-
307 ("An action may be brought within four years:... for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law.") Greer claims he was injured at a Big 5 store on December 1,2001. (R. 2.) 
The trial court correctly determined, however, that Greer did not file his complaint until 
December 2,2005, a day after the expiration of the statute of limitations. (R. 127.) 
In order to challenge a court's factual findings, "an appellant must first marshal all 
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in light most favorable to the 
court below." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94,121, 54 P.3d 
1177. If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate court has grounds to affirm 
the court's findings on that basis alone. Wilson Supply, 2002 UT 94 at f26. Greer 
claims that there is "literally no evidence to marshal." (Appellant Brief at 7.) 
In situations where there is virtually nothing in the record that would support the 
trial court's findings, a claim of no evidence might be sufficient. However, an 
appellee need only point to a scintilla of evidence that supports a court's findings 
in order to refute an appellant's claim of no evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 8 2 , | 82, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting Wilson Supply, 2002 UT 94 
at If 22). 
In this case, Greer made no effort to explain what evidence the trial court relied on 
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and why it was not sufficient. Specifically, Greer did not mention the complaint on file 
with the Third District bearing a date stamp of December 2,2005. (Appellant's Brief at 
12.) Instead, Greer simply contends that the complaint served on Big 5 bearing a date 
stamp of November 28,2005 should be controlling for determining whether Greer timely 
filed his complaint. Id. Notwithstanding that the Third District has no record of ever 
having received the November 28, 2005 complaint, Greer claims that his counsel placed 
the complaint in the Third District's pleading drop box. Id. Greer, however, failed to 
present any affidavits or other evidentiary materials in support of this contention to the 
trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. Thus, this fact should be disregarded. See 
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah R. Civ. P 
56(e)) (When a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and 
fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by 
Subdivision (e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of 
fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence of such 
an issue.) Furthermore, any such evidence regarding the circumstances of the filing of 
the complaint bearing a date stamp of November 28,2005 must have been submitted to 
the trial court for its consideration, and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Ong Iran v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 1993) (stating that failure to raise 
issue in trial court precludes its consideration on appeal). 
Greer failed both at the trial court level and now on appeal to address the fact that 
the only complaint in the Third District's file bears a date stamp of December 2, 2005. 
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Greer also cannot explain why the signatures and handwritten dates on the two 
complaints are clearly different. (R. 3, 62.) If counsel signed and filed the Complaint on 
November 28, 2005, why did he sign and date another copy and file it again on December 
2,2005? What happened to the November 28, 2005 complaint that he allegedly dropped 
in the Court's rear drop box? Greer had ample opportunity to offer a reasonable 
explanation for this discrepancy at the trial court, yet failed to do so. The trial court 
considered all of these facts and properly found that there was not sufficient evidence to 
support Greer's assertion that he filed the complaint on November 28,2005. Instead, the 
trial court correctly found that Greer did not file his complaint until December 2,2005, 
after the statute of limitations had expired. This finding is supported by sufficient 
evidence and should be affirmed on appeal. 
POINT 2: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED DUE TO A 
STATUTORY PROHIBITION. 
Greer argues that the statute of limitations was tolled because Big 5 was subject to 
a statutory prohibition when Big 5 forfeited its certificate of incorporation for failure to 
designate a registered agent in Delaware. Greer's reliance on section 78B-2-112 of the 
Utah Code, however, is misplaced and the trial correctly determined that the 
commencement of Greer's action was not stayed by any statutory prohibition. When 
interpreting a statute, 
[the] primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve. The best evidence of the true intent and purpose 
of the legislature in enacting a statute is the plain language of the statute. We 
therefore look first to the statute's plain language. 
3 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., Inc., 2000 UT 90, f 7, 15 P.3d 1030 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
The statute provides that "[w]hen the commencement of a cause of action is stayed 
by injunction or a statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or 
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-2-112 (Supp. 2008). Pursuant to the statute's plain language, a statute 
of limitations is only tolled when the plaintiff is prohibited by injunction or statute from 
proceeding with his claims during an injunction or mandatory stay. See, e.g., Beaver 
County v. Property Tax Div. et al, 2006 UT 6, \ 37,128 P.3d 1187 (party's claims tolled 
during mandatory stay); Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992) 
(reading 78-12-41 in conjunction with the stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 
plaintiffs action was tolled for the duration of the stay); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & 
Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996) (statute of limitations period for action by depositors of 
failed thrift institutions was tolled pursuant to Thrifts Settlement Financing Act which 
imposed statutory prohibition on prosecution of claims until panel issued its report 
authorizing depositor's claims for litigation). 
Here, Greer presupposes that he was statutorily prohibited from bringing suit 
during the period of time Big 5 was in forfeiture, which is simply not the case. Indeed, 
Greer has not cited, nor has Big 5 uncovered, any statute prohibiting the commencement 
of an action against a corporation that is in forfeiture. In fact, both Delaware and Utah 
4 
law are to the contrary. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff is not barred from bringing suit 
against a corporation in forfeiture for failure to designate a registered agent. Section 136 
of the Delaware Corporation Code provides in pertinent part, 
After the resignation of the registered agent shall have become effective as 
provided in this section and if no new registered agent shall have been obtained 
and designated . . . service of legal process against the corporation . . . shall 
thereafter be upon the Secretary of State. 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 136(c). 
Similarly, under Utah law "the failure of a foreign corporation to have authority to 
transact business in this state does not impair the validity of its corporate acts, nor does 
the failure prevent the corporation from defending any proceeding in this state." Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10a-1502(6). Moreover, during the time limited for the commencement 
of this action, Big 5 had the authority to transact business in the state of Utah as a foreign 
corporation and had a registered agent for service of process within the state. (R. 115-
116.) Accordingly, section 78B-2-112 of the Utah Code is not applicable to toll the 
statute of limitations because there is no statutory prohibition that prevented Greer from 
bringing an action against Big 5 during the limitations period. 
POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-2-104 DID NOT TOLL THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The trial court did not err in rejecting Greer's argument that section 78B-2-104 of 
the Utah Code tolled the applicable statute of limitations from June 12, 2003 to 
November 3,2003. The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that the purpose of Utah's 
5 
tolling statute is "to prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of 
suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation." Olseth v. 
Larson, 2007 UT 29, \ 24,158 P.3d 532 (citations omitted). Indeed, the "legislative 
intent is ascertainable from the plain language of the tolling statute . . . [which] expressly 
prevents a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of a valid claim merely by leaving the 
state." Id. The statute states, "[i]f after a cause of action accrues [the defendant] departs 
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-104. 
Greer's argument erroneously assumes two legal and factual propositions: (1) if a 
corporation forfeits its corporate status due to failure to appoint a registered agent then 
the corporation ceases to exist; and (2) if a corporation ceases to exist in its state of 
incorporation then it is "absent" from the state of Utah for purposes of the tolling statute. 
(Appellant's brief at 10-11.) Not only does Greer fail to provide any legal authority in 
support of these propositions, but his arguments are directly contrary to both the law and 
the facts. 
Delaware law is determinative of whether Big 5 continued to exist as a corporation 
while in forfeiture. Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163, 166 (Utah 
1977) (citing Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Second, Sec. 299, which states: "(1) 
whether the existence of a corporation has been terminated or suspended is determined by 
the local law of the state of incorporation. (2) The termination or suspension of a 
corporation's existence by the state of incorporation will be recognized for most purposes 
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by other states.") Delaware statutory and case law clearly states that forfeiture is not the 
equivalent of dissolution. When a corporation has forfeited its charter, with a provision 
for revival, it does not cease to exist and remains subject to suit. See Frederic G. Krapf 
& Son, Inc. v. Gorson, 243 A.2d 713 (Del. 1968) (held corporation does not cease to exist 
during a period of forfeiture and remains subject to suit); Wax v. Riverview Cemetery Co., 
24 A.2d 431,435-36 (corporation with a forfeited charter is not dissolved, but merely in a 
suspended state, and thus amenable to suit). 
Section 136 of the Delaware Corporation Code, which addresses resignation of 
registered agents, is intended to assure the orderly maintenance of an agent for the 
convenience of parties wishing to bring actions against a corporation. It specifically 
provides, in subsection (b), that corporations which fail to designate new agents will have 
their charters forfeited, and in subsection (c) that service of process shall thereafter be 
made upon the Secretary of State. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 136. Nowhere in the statute 
does it provide that a corporation ceases to exist and lacks the capacity to be sued. Id. 
Section 312 also expressly provides that the corporation may reestablish its good 
standing by nomination of a successor agent. Upon filing the certificate of restoration 
and revival, Big 5's certificate of incorporation was fully revived and reinstated effective 
on June 11,2003, as if the forfeiture had never occurred. (R. 113.) The Delaware 
Corporation Code states: 
Upon the filing of the certificate in accordance with § 103 of this title the 
corporation shall be renewed and revived with the same force and effect as if its 
certificate of incorporation had not been forfeited or void pursuant to this title, or 
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had not expired by limitation and the corporation after its renewal and revival 
shall be as exclusively liable for all contracts, acts, matter and things made, done 
or performed in its name and on its behalf by its officers and agents prior to its 
reinstatement, as if its certificate of incorporation had at all times remained in full 
force and effect. 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 312 (emphasis added). See also Certificate of Restoration and 
Revival of Certificate of Incorporation of Big 5 Corp (R. 113.) 
Utah law likewise holds that suspension [the equivalent of forfeiture under 
Delaware law] of a certificate of incorporation does not mean the end of corporate 
existence. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (a "dissolved corporation continues its 
corporate existence . . . and [dissolution of a corporation does not . . . prevent 
commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name.") 
See also Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding suspension of 
corporation did not affect corporation's existence); Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, Inc., 
460 P.2d 828 (Utah 1969) (the term suspended itself imports a temporary restriction of 
function not the end of corporate existence); Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines 
Development Co., 269 P. 147,151-52 (Utah 1928) (held that foreign corporations may 
assert a statue of limitations defense even if the corporation failed to register an agent or 
otherwise comply with statutes governing foreign corporations). Thus, not only did Big 5 
continue to exist during the period of forfeiture, but Big 5's corporate status was revived 
and reinstated as if the forefeiture never occurred. Moreover, Big 5 was registered to 
conduct business in the state of Utah and had a registered agent for service of process 
within the state during the entire limitations period. (R. 115-116.) Thus, the trial court 
correctly rejected Greer's argument that the statute of limitations was tolled because Big 
5 was "absent". 
POINT 4: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court shall grant a 
request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the 
action . . . unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous 
or the issue has been authoritatively decided." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court properly denied Greer's request for a hearing because the dispostive 
issues governing the granting of Big 5's motion for summary judgment have been 
authoritatively decided and Greer's opposition memorandum was frivolous. (R. 150.) 
Neither section 78B-2-112 nor 78B-2-104 of the Utah Code are applicable to toll the 
statute of limitations here. In fact, Greer fails to cite to any statutory prohibition against 
commencing suit against a corporation in forfeiture for failure to appoint a registered 
agent. Point 2, supra at 4,5. Greer likewise fails to cite to controlling Delaware and Utah 
law, which cleaily provide that a corporation continues to exist and is subject to suit even 
if its corporate charter has been forfeited. Point 3, supra at 6-8. Greer's argument that 
Big 5 was "absent" from the state of Utah for 144 days is likewise frivolous as it is 
contrary to both the law and the facts. Id. 
Even if the trial court erred in not holding the hearing, for such error to compel 
reversal of the trial court's substantive ruling, it must have been prejudicial. Price v. 
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Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997). "If the error was harmless, that is, if the error 
was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the 
outcome of the case , then a reversal is not in order." Id. (citations omitted). Greer has 
failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling on the summary judgment 
motion without a hearing. He has not shown that he would have made new or additional 
arguments at the hearing that were not covered by his memorandum in opposition. 
Indeed, the arguments made by Greer on appeal to this Court in his appellate brief are the 
same arguments that he made in his memorandum before the trial court. Thus, this Court 
should find that even if the trial court erred in not holding a hearing on Big 5's motion for 
summary judgment, such error was harmless. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted Big 5's Motion for Summary Judgment. On the 
undisputed facts presented to the trial court, Greer filed his complaint on December 2, 
2005, after the applicable statute of limitation had expired. Moreover, Greer was not 
statutorily prohibited from bringing his claims against Big 5 during the limitation period. 
The tolling statute likewise does not apply given that Big 5 was not "absent" from the 
state of Utah during forfeiture since Big 5 continued to exist in Utah as a corporate entity 
and had a registered agent within the state at all times during the limitations period. 
Accordingly, Big 5 respectfully requests that the Court affirm the decision of the trial 
court dismissing Greer's claims. 
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